Most wars are not fought for reasons of security or material interests, but instead reflect a nation’s ‘spirit’ by Lebow, Richard N.
Imperial War Museum, Second World War Collection, B10047 (Public
Domain)
16/07/2013
Most wars are not fought for reasons of security or material
interests, but instead reflect a nation’s ‘spirit’
blogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2013/07/16/most-wars-are-not-fought-for-reasons-of-security-or-material-interests-
but-instead-reflect-a-nations-spirit/
Why do nations decide to go to war? Based on the extensive study of inter-state wars since 1648, Richard
Ned Lebow outlines his analysis of the motivations which underpin warfare. He finds that contrary
to the expectations of most international relations theories, wars fought primarily for reasons of
security, or material interests, have been relatively rare. Rather, motivations related to a nation’s
‘spirit’, such as the standing of a country or revenge, have been the principal causes of most wars.
There is a burgeoning literature on war and its causes. Almost all major studies approach the
problem from a realist perspective. They assume security is the principal motive of states and
insecurity the major cause of war. Realist theories elaborate mechanisms (balance of power) and
conditions (security dilemma, polarity, power transition) that they consider responsible for conflict and war.
My dissatisfaction with the existing literature on war, and international relations more generally, was an incentive to
write A Cultural Theory of International Relations  (Cambridge University Press, 2008). That book develops a theory
of international relations based on a parsimonious model of human motivation. Following Plato and Aristotle, I posit
spirit, appetite and reason as fundamental drives with distinct goals. They generate different logics concerning
cooperation, conflict and risk-taking. They require, and help generate, characteristic forms of hierarchy based on
different principles of justice. A fourth motive—fear—enters the picture when reason is unable to constrain appetite
or spirit. Fear is a powerful emotion, not an innate drive. In real worlds, multiple motives mix rather than blend, giving
rise to a range of behaviours that often appear contradictory.
In modern times the spirit (thumos) has largely been
ignored by philosophy and social science. I contend it is
omnipresent. It gives rise to the universal drive for self-
esteem, which finds expression in the quest for honor or
standing. By excelling at activities valued by our peer
group or society, we win the approbation of those who
matter and feel good about ourselves.
Institutions and states have neither psyches nor
emotions. The people who run these collectivities or
identify with them do. They often project their
psychological needs on to their political units, and feel
better about themselves when those units win victories
or perform well. Transference and esteem by vicarious
association are especially pronounced in the age of
nationalism where the state has become the relevant
unit.
I documented the relevance of the spirit for war in a
series of case studies in A Cultural Theory of
International Relations. In Why Nations Fight
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) I extend my
analysis to war throughout the modern era and analyse
war initiation in terms of the relative power of states and their respective motives for war. I constructed a data set of
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all inter-state wars involving great and aspiring rising powers from 1648 to the present. The data set identifies
initiators of war (often multiple); their motives (security, material advantage, standing, revenge, and domestic
politics); the outcome (win, lose, or draw); the nature of the rules, if any, governing warfare; the duration and intensity
of the war; and the character of the peace settlement.
Contrary to realist expectations, I find security responsible for only 19 of 94 wars. A significant number of these wars
pitted great powers against other great powers and none of them were associated with power transitions. This does
not mean that security is unimportant in international affairs; it was a primary concern of all states that were
attacked. Material interests are also a weak motive for war, being responsible for only 8 wars, and most of those in
the eighteenth century. Security and material interest sometimes act in concert with one another, and more often
with other motives. In some wars they are secondary to these other motives.
Standing, by contrast, is responsible for 62 wars as a primary or secondary motive. Revenge, also a manifestation of
the spirit, is implicated in another 11. There can be little doubt that the spirit is the principal cause of war across the
centuries, and that it and its consequences have been almost totally ignored in the international relations literature.
The character and robustness of domestic, regional and international societies and ideas about the efficacy of war
determine the relative importance of various motives for war and its overall frequency. Interest shows a sharp
decline once mercantilism gave way to more sophisticated understandings of wealth. Security-motivated wars show
no similar decline by century but come in clusters associated with bids for hegemony by great or dominant powers.
The most recent clusters of security-related wars were associated with the run up and conduct of the two world wars
of the twentieth century. They were in turn a product of the dislocations brought about of modernisation in an
environment where great power competition and the drive for hegemony were conducted primarily by violent means.
Now that this era has passed in Europe and is receding in much of the Pacific Rim, and hegemony achieved by
force is no longer considered a legitimate ambition, the security requirements and fears of great powers should
decline.
Wars of standing can also be expected to decline. During the post-war era, and even more since the end of that
conflict, war and standing have become increasingly disengaged in the sense that successful war initiation no longer
enhances standing. Successful war initiation may actually lead to loss of standing in the absence of United Nations’
approval of the military initiative in question. The Anglo-American intervention in Iraq—a war in which territorial
conquest was not an issue—is a case in point. Changing values and norms encourage rational leaders to find other,
peaceful ways of claiming standing. To the extent that this happens, the frequency of war involving either rising or
great powers can be expected to diminish sharply.
I contend that three shifts in thinking have dramatically affected the frequency of war and its associated motives.
The first concerns the nature of wealth. Until Adam Smith and modern economics, the world’s wealth was thought to
be finite, with an increase in wealth for any state thought to result in a loss for others. When political elites learned
that wealth could be augmented by the division of labour, mechanical sources of energy and economies of scale,
and economic cooperation, war increasingly came to be seen as detrimental to wealth. This recognition all but put
an end to wars of material aggrandisement.
The second shift concerns collective versus unilateral pursuit of security. Alliances assumed new meaning at the
Congress of Vienna as they had the goal of conflict prevention. Later congresses helped great powers ease regional
tensions through agreements and moral persuasion. Following World War I, the League of Nations was given the
more ambitious task of preventing war by means of collective security, but failed miserably. The principle of collective
security endured and the United Nations, established in 1945, made it the principal mission of the Security Council.
The UN’s record is mixed, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been more successful. It and other
international groupings have played a prominent and arguably successful role in keeping the peace or terminating
wars in the post-Cold War world. Collective security has become the norm and an important source of regional and
international stability.
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The third and most recent shift in thinking concerns the
nature of standing in international affairs. Historically,
military success was the principal means of gaining
standing and recognition as a great power. There are
now other ways of achieving status. The European
Union, Scandinavia, Canada, Japan and Brazil all claim
standing on grounds that have nothing to do with
military might. They emphasise their wealth, how they
use it to help their citizens and less well-off countries
and the public goods they provide for their regions or
the international community.
The more robust regional and international orders
become, the more multiple hierarchies of standing will
also emerge at the international level. States will feel
more confident about seeking standing in diverse ways
and devoting resources toward this end that might
otherwise be reserved for the military. If peace
continues among the major powers, claims for standing
on the basis of military power will become even less
persuasive. As standing confers influence, states will
have additional incentives to shift their foreign policies to
bring them in line with the dominant incentive
structure. In such a world states would view even more
negatively the use of force in the absence of unqualified
international support.
From the vantage point of say the year 2030, we might look back on the Iraq war as one of the defining moments of
the international relations of the twenty-first century because of the way it delegitimised the unilateral use of force
and foregrounded and encouraged alternative, peaceful means of gaining standing.
This article draws on material from Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/12jD2Ti
 _________________________________
About the author
Richard Ned Lebow – King’s College London / Dartmouth College
Professor Richard Ned Lebow is Professor of International Political Theory at the Department of
War Studies, King’s College London, and James O. Freedman Presidential Professor Emeritus at
Dartmouth College. His recent books include The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of
Ourselves (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for
War (Cambridge University Press, 2010), and A Cultural Theory of International Relations
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
3/4
4/4
